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We present a unified approach to solving contracting problems with full information in
models driven by Brownian motion. We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give
necessary and sufficient conditions for contracts that implement the so-called first-best
solution. The optimal contract is proportional to the difference between the underly-
ing process controlled by the agent and a stochastic, state-contingent benchmark. Our
methodology covers a number of frameworks considered in the existing literature. The
main finance applications of this theory are optimal compensation of company executives
and of portfolio managers.
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and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
In the recent years there has been a significant revival of interest in the so-called risk-
sharing problems and principal-agent problems from economics and finance, especially
in continuous time models. Main applications in finance include optimal reward of port-
folio managers and optimal compensation of company executives.
The problem involves an interaction between two parties to a contract: an agent and a
principal. Through the contract, the principal tries to induce the agent to act in line with
the principal’s interests. In our setting, both the principal and the agent have full infor-
mation. In such a case, the problem is known as risk-sharing, since the optimal solution
maximizes a combination of the objective functions of the principal and the agent, and
represents the best way to share the risk between them. This solution is called the first-
best solution. However, in addition to risk-sharing, we focus on the question of finding
as simple as possible contracts which induce the agent to implement actions which will
lead to the principal attaining the first-best utility.
In this paper, we consider principal-agent problems in continuous time, in which
both the volatility (the diffusion coefficient) and the drift of the underlying process can
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be controlled by the agent. The pioneering paper in the continuous-time framework is
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom [5], which showed that if both the principal and the agent have
exponential utilities, then the optimal contract is linear. Their framework, however, is not
that of risk-sharing, but of so-called “hidden information” or “moral hazard” case: the
principal cannot directly observe the actions of the agent, who controls the drift only. We
consider the (harder) hidden information case in a follow-up paper, by Cvitanic´ et al. [2],
in more general models.
Here, as mentioned above, we study the full information case, in which the principal
can observe the agent’s actions. Although often less realistic than the hidden information
case, we would like to point out that our full information framework is directly applica-
ble to the important finance problem of optimal reward of portfolio managers. We will
see that in such a context the optimal contracts do not require observing the manager’s
actions anyway. We would also like to point out that the extension to continuous-time
models is important for these reasons: such a model is appropriate for portfolio manage-
ment applications, and it also brings the principal-agent literature in line with popular
option pricingmodels. This is especially important nowwhenUS companies are required
to price employee/executive options.
In the existing literature under full information, it is usually assumed that the prin-
cipal would force the agent to implement the controls which are best for the principal,
the first-best solution. Instead, we study the implementability of the first-best solution
by relatively simple contracts, and show that the contract that implements the solution is
proportional to the difference between the terminal value of the underlying process and
a stochastic, state-contingent benchmark. This should be of significant interest in finan-
cial economics, because it justifies the use of linear contracts (paying “shares” rather than
“options”), as long as we allow the remaining payment to be a random outcome of a spe-
cific benchmark portfolio. It can also be interpreted, in the firm context, as a contract in
which the principal sells the firm to the agent in exchange for a specific random payment
at a given future time.
Literature on the first-best case in continuous time includes Mu¨ller [10, 11], who finds
the solution in the exponential utilities case, when the drift is controlled, and shows how
it can be approximated by control revisions taking place at discrete times. Very general
framework with several agents and recursive utilities is considered in Duffie et al. [3] and
Dumas et al. [4]. Ou-Yang [13] also considers the principal-agent problem in the con-
text of delegated portfolio management. In his paper, the agent controls the volatility and
the drift simultaneously. While he restricts the family of allowable contracts, motivated
by the fact that the principal may not observe full information, the restricted solution
of his problem turns out to be the same as the solution of our full information prob-
lem, and thus the restriction does not really matter. That paper uses Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equations as the technical tool. In Cadenillas et al. [1] the results of Ou-Yang
[13] have been generalized to a setting where the drift is also controlled by the agent in-
dependently of the volatility, and the principal observes it. They use duality-martingale
methods, familiar from the portfolio optimization theory. Because of the limitations of
that approach, the results of those two papers are obtained in the setting of linear dynam-
ics (although the cost function is allowed to be nonlinear). Larsen [7] solves numerically
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the case with power utilities for the linear, portfolio delegation case, for contracts which
depend only on the final value of the portfolio.
While this and other existing literature usually search for optimal contracts in a spe-
cific, reduced family of contracts, we consider completely general contracts, with general
diffusion dynamics for the underlying process, and we have general utility functions (sep-
arable or not separable) and a general cost function. However, as mentioned above, our
contracts often turn out to be of simple form allowed by usual restricted families. We are
able to deal with such a general framework by using the “stochastic maximum principle”
method of stochastic control theory. (For other applications of stochastic maximumprin-
ciple in finance, see the recent book by Oksendal and Sulem [12].) In general, it is more
straightforward to find explicit solutions (when they exist) from the characterization we
obtain, compared to the above-mentioned methods.
We do not discuss the existence of the optimal control. Instead, the stochastic maxi-
mum principle enables us to characterize the optimal contract via a solution to forward-
backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs), possibly fully coupled. For some of
these there is a theory that guarantees existence. However, in general, it is not known un-
der which general conditions these equations have a solution. Nevertheless, we can find
optimal contracts in many examples. The stochastic maximum principle is covered in the
book by Yong and Zhou [17], while FBSDEs are studied in, for example, [6, 14], and in
the monograph by Ma and Yong [9] which contains more references.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we set up the contracting problem with
full information and we find the first-best solution, the one that corresponds to the best
controls from the principal’s point of view. In Section 3 we show that those controls are
implementable, that is, there is a contract which induces the agent to implement the first-
best controls. We present some examples in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5, men-
tioning possible further research topics.
2. The first-best solution
Because we assume that the principal can observe the actions of the agent, it turns out
that the principal can induce the agent to use the controls which are optimal for the
principal, called the first-best solution. We find the first-best controls in this section. The
contract that achieves this solution is called the first-best contract, and we study it in the
subsequent section.
2.1. The model. Let {Wt}t≥0 be a d-dimensional Brownian motion on a probability
space (Ω,,P), and denote by F := {t}t≤T its augmented filtration on the interval [0,T].
The controlled state process is denoted X = Xu,v and its dynamics are given by
dXt = f
(
t,Xt ,ut,vt
)
dt+ vtdWt, (2.1)
where (X ,u,v) take values inR×Rm×Rd, and f is a function taking values inR, possibly
random and such that, as a process, it is F-adapted. The notation xy for two vectors
x, y ∈Rd indicates the inner product.
4 Optimal contracts
In the principal-agent problems, the principal gives the agent compensation CT =
F(ω,X) at time T , where F :Ω×C[0,T]→R is a (deterministic) mapping such that CT is
T measurable. We say that F is a contract. One of the main results of the paper is that the
optimal contract, for the problem below, will be of the form F(ω,X) = XT − BT(ω) for
some T-measurable random variable (“benchmark”) BT . The agent chooses the con-
trols u and v in order to maximize his utility:
V1(F) := sup
u,v
V1(u,v;F) := sup
u,v
E
[
U1
(
F
(
ω,Xu,v
)
,Gu,vT
)]
. (2.2)
Here, Gu,vT :=
∫ T
0 g(t,Xt,ut,vt)dt is the accumulated cost of the agent, and with a slight
abuse of notation we use notation V1 both for the objective function and its maximum.
Remark 2.1. The control u has the interpretation of the level of effort the agent applies to
her projects, which only affects the drift, but not the volatility of X . Typically, the higher
u, the higher the value of X . On the other hand, the choice of v represents the choice
of the volatility of X , although it may also have an impact on the expected value of X .
We interpret the choice of v as a choice of projects, and the choice of v is related to the
mean-variance tradeoff in available projects (higher meanmeans also higher risk, and the
other way round). For example, if we think of the agent as an executive of a company, we
may want to assume that she can increase the company value with her effort u, without
increasing the volatility risk. On the other hand, in the portfolio management application
mentioned below, the manager can only affect the portfolio value by simultaneously af-
fecting the drift and the volatility through the choice of v. We could be more general and
instead of v have the diffusion term equal to σ(t,Xt ,vt). However, it is often possible to
do the transformation of variables v˜t  σ(t,Xt,vt), which reduces to the model we study.
In particular, in the important application of portfolio management, we can usually take
σ(t,Xt,vt)= σtvt for some given process σt of invertible matrices, so that the transforma-
tion of variables is straightforward. The case of “incomplete markets,” in which σ(t,Xt ,vt)
does not cover the same range as v, is left for future research.
We say a contract F is implementable if there exists a pair (uF ,vF) such that
V1
(
uF ,vF ;F
)=V1(F). (2.3)
The principal maximizes her utility:
V2 :=max
F
E
[
U2
(
Xu
F ,vF
T −F
(
ω,Xu
F ,vF
))]
, (2.4)
where the maximum is over all implementable contracts F such that the following partic-
ipation constraint or individual rationality (IR) constraint holds:
V1(F)≥ R. (2.5)
Functions U1 and U2 are the utility functions of the agent and the principal. Function
g is a penalty function on the agent’s effort. Constant R is the reservation utility of the
agent and represents the value of the agent’s outside opportunities, theminimum value he
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requires to accept the job. The typical cases studied in the literature are the separable util-
ity case, with U1(x, y)=U1(x)− y, and the nonseparable case with U1(x, y)=U1(x− y),
where, with a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation U1 also for the function
of one argument only. We could also have the same generality for U2, but this makes less
sense from the economics point of view.
We note that it is equivalent to define a contract as a functional F(u,v,X). In the hid-
den action case, which we study in a follow-up paper, a contract takes the form F(X).
Example 2.2 (the case of portfolio management). A simple motivating example is the
model
dXt = αvtdt+ vtdWt (2.6)
with one-dimensional W . If we write vt = σπt for a constant σ > 0, this model corre-
sponds to a value of a portfolio strategy that invests amount πt at time t in a risky stock
modeled by a geometric Brownian motion, with volatility σ , and constant risk-premium
α. When the cost function g is zero, in a later section we find explicit optimal contracts for
this case as an example of our general theory. We also show that in this case we can find a
deterministic function F such that the contract F(XT) is optimal. Moreover, we consider
an example from Ou-Yang when the cost function is not zero, but utility functions are
exponential.
We now come to the technical part of the problem. Denote by L2n the set of adapted
processes x with values in Rn for which E
∫ T
0 |xt|2dt <∞. Also denote by ∂xU1 the deriv-
ative of U1 with respect to the first argument, and with ∂yU1 the derivative of U1 with
respect to the second argument. In this section we impose the following assumptions.
(A1) Functions f ,g : [0,T]×R×Rm ×Rd ×Ω→ R are continuously differentiable
with respect to x, u, v such that fx, gx are uniformly bounded, and fu, fv, gu, gv
have uniform linear growth in x, u, v. In addition, f is jointly concave and g is
jointly convex in (x,u,v).
(A2) Functions U1 : R2 → R, U2 : R→ R are differentiable, with ∂xU1 > 0, ∂yU1 < 0,
U ′2 > 0, U1 is jointly concave, and U2 is concave.
(A3) The admissible set  is the set of all those control triples (CT ,u,v) such that
(i) u ∈ L2m, v ∈ L2d, E{
∫ T
0 f (t,0,ut,vt)
2dt} <∞, CT is an T-measurable ran-
dom variable;
(ii) for any bounded (ΔCT ,Δu,Δv) satisfying (i), there exists ε0 > 0 such that
E
{∣∣U1
(
CεT ,G
ε
T
)∣∣+
∣
∣U2
(
XεT −CεT
)∣∣} <∞ ∀ε ∈ [0,ε0
]
, (2.7)
and |U ′2(XεT −CεT)|2, |∂xU1(CεT ,GεT)|, |∂yU1(CεT ,GεT)|2 are uniformly inte-
grable for ε ∈ [0,ε0], where
CεT  CT + εΔCT ; uεt  ut + εΔut; vεt  vt + εΔvt;
Xεt = x+
∫ t
0
f
(
s,Xεs ,u
ε
s ,v
ε
s
)
ds+
∫ t
0
vεs dWs; G
ε
T 
∫ T
0
g
(
t,Xεt ,u
ε
t ,v
ε
t
)
dt.
(2.8)
(A4) There exists (CT ,u,v)∈ such that E{U1(CT ,GT)} ≥ R.
6 Optimal contracts
Remark 2.3. Ourmethod also applies to the case in which u, v are constrained to take val-
ues in a convex domain, and/or in which the functionsUi may only be defined on convex
domains, such as power utilities. In this case, we would need to change the definitions of
ΔCT , Δu, Δv. For example, we would define Δu = u˜− u, where u˜ is any other drift con-
trol satisfying (A3)(i), such that Δu is bounded. Moreover, for our maximum principle
conditions (2.47) to hold as equalities, we would need to assume that the optimal triple
(ĈT , û, v̂) takes values in the interior of its domain.
Remark 2.4. We will see that our sufficient conditions are valid for a wider set of admis-
sible triples, with ε0 = 0 in (A3).
Remark 2.5. If U1, U2 have polynomial growth, the uniform integrability in (A3)(ii) au-
tomatically holds true. If they have exponential growth, there are some discussions on the
integrability of exponential processes in Yong [16].
Note that (2.1) has a unique strong solution: by (A3)(i) we have
E
{∫ T
0
[
v2t + f
(
t,0,ut,vt
)2]
dt
}
<∞. (2.9)
Then by boundedness of | fx| and by standard arguments we get E{supt |Xt|2} <∞. We
also note that, for (u,v) satisfying (A3)(i) and (Δu,Δv) bounded, (uε,vε) also satisfies
(A3)(i). In fact, since fu and fv have uniform linear growth, we have
∣
∣ f
(
t,0,uεt ,v
ε
t
)− f (t,0,ut,vt
)∣∣=
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ ε
0
[
fu
(
t,0,uθt ,v
θ
t
)
Δut + fv
(
t,0,uθt ,v
θ
t
)
Δvt
]
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
≤ C[1+∣∣ut
∣
∣+
∣
∣vt
∣
∣].
(2.10)
Then
E
{∫ T
0
f
(
t,0,uεt ,v
ε
t
)2
dt
}
≤ CE
{∫ T
0
[
f
(
t,0,ut,vt
)2
+ 1+
∣
∣ut
∣
∣2 +
∣
∣vt
∣
∣2
]
dt
}
<∞.
(2.11)
Thus (2.8) also has a unique strong solution.
We first consider the so-called first-best solution: in this setting it is actually the princi-
pal who chooses the controls u and v, and provides the agent with compensation CT so
that the IR constraint is satisfied. In other words, the principal’s value function is
V 2 := sup
CT ,u,v
E
[
U2
(
XT −CT
)]
, (2.12)
where (CT ,u,v)∈ is chosen so that
E
[
U1
(
CT ,G
u,v
T
)]≥ R. (2.13)
In fact, in Section 3 we will prove that (under some conditions), if (ĈT , û, v̂) is the optimal
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solution to this problem, then there is an implementable contract F such that uF = û,
vF = v̂, and F(ω,Xû,v̂)= Ĉ. Then obviously
V2 =V 2. (2.14)
To simplify the notations, from now on we abuse the notation and use V2 to denote the
right-hand side of (2.12). Also for simplicity, henceforth we use the notation for the case
when all the processes are one-dimensional.
In order to solve the optimization problem (2.12), we define the Lagrangian as follows
for a given constant λ > 0:
J
(
CT ,u,v;λ
)= E[U2
(
Xu,vT −CT
)
+ λ
(
U1
(
CT ,G
u,v
T
)−R)]. (2.15)
Because of our assumptions, by the standard optimization theory (see Luenberger [8]),
we have
V2 = sup
CT ,u,v
J
(
CT ,u,v; λ̂
)
(2.16)
for some λ̂ > 0. Moreover, if the maximum is attained in (2.12) by (ĈT , û, v̂), then it is
attained by the same triple in the right-hand side of (2.16), and we have
E
[
U1
(
ĈT ,G
û,v̂
T
)]= R. (2.17)
Conversely, if there exists λ̂ > 0 and (ĈT , û, v̂) such that the maximum is attained in the
right-hand side of (2.16) and such that E[U1(ĈT ,G
û,v̂
T )]= R, then (ĈT , û, v̂) is also optimal
for the problem V2 of (2.12).
2.2.Necessary conditions for optimality. We cannot directly apply standard approaches
to deriving necessary conditions for optimality, as presented, for example, in the book
Yong and Zhou [17], because our optimization problem has a nonstandard form. Thus,
we present here a proof starting from the scratch.
Fix λ and suppose that (CT ,u,v) ∈ and (ΔCT ,Δu,Δv) is uniformly bounded. Let
ε0 > 0 be the constant determined in (A3)(iii). For ε ∈ (0,ε0), recall (2.8) and denote
Jε  J
(
CεT ,u
ε,vε
)
; J  J
(
CT ,u,v
)
;
∇Xεt 
Xεt −Xt
ε
; ∇GεT 
GεT −GT
ε
; ∇Jε  J
ε− J
ε
.
(2.18)
Moreover, let∇X be the solution to the SDE
∇Xt =
∫ t
0
[
fx(s)∇Xs + fu(s)Δus + fv(s)Δvs
]
ds+
∫ t
0
ΔvsdWs, (2.19)
where fu(t)Δut 
∑m
i=1 ∂ui f (t,Xt,ut,vt)Δu
i
t, and fx(t)∇Xt, fv(t)Δvt are defined in a similar
8 Optimal contracts
way. By (A1) and (A3)(i) one can easily show that
E
{∫ T
0
[∣
∣ fuΔut
∣
∣2 +
∣
∣ fvΔvt
∣
∣2 +
∣
∣Δvt
∣
∣2
]
dt
}
<∞. (2.20)
Thus (2.19) has a strong solution∇Xt such that E{sup0≤t≤T |∇Xt|2} <∞.
The following lemmas show that the finite difference quotients in (2.18) converge.
Lemma 2.6. Assume (A1) and (A3)(i). Then lim→0E{sup0≤t≤T |∇Xεt −∇Xt|2} = 0.
Proof. First, by standard arguments one can easily show that
lim
→0
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
∣
∣Xεt −Xt
∣
∣2
}
= 0. (2.21)
Next, we note that
∇Xεt =
∫ t
0
[
αεs∇Xεs +βεsΔus + γεsΔvs
]
ds+
∫ t
0
ΔvsdWs, (2.22)
where
αεt 
∫ 1
0
fx
(
t,Xt + θ
(
Xεt −Xt
)
,uεt ,v
ε
t
)
dθ;
βεt 
∫ 1
0
fu
(
t,Xt,uθεt ,v
θε
t
)
dθ; γεt 
∫ 1
0
fv
(
t,Xt,uθεt ,v
θε
t
)
dθ.
(2.23)
By (A1) and the fact that Δu, Δv are bounded, there exists a constant C > 0 indepen-
dent of ε such that
∣
∣αεt
∣
∣≤ C, ∣∣βεt
∣
∣+
∣
∣γεt
∣
∣≤ C[1+∣∣Xt
∣
∣+
∣
∣ut
∣
∣+
∣
∣vt
∣
∣]. (2.24)
Denote Δ∇Xε ∇Xε−∇X and
α0t  fx
(
t,Xt,ut,vt
)
, β0t  fu
(
t,Xt ,ut,vt
)
, γ0t  fv
(
t,Xt,ut,vt
)
. (2.25)
Then
Δ∇Xεt =
∫ t
0
[
αεsΔ∇Xεs +
(
αεs −α0s
)∇Xs +
(
βεs −β0s
)
Δus +
(
γεs − γ0s
)
Δvs
]
ds. (2.26)
Denote Λεt  exp(−
∫ t
0 α
ε
sds). Then
Δ∇Xεt =
[
Λεt
]−1
∫ t
0
Λεs
[(
αεs −α0s
)∇Xs +
(
βεs −β0s
)
Δus +
(
γεs − γ0s
)
Δvs
]
ds. (2.27)
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Since |Λεt |+ |Λεt |−1 ≤ C, and Δu, Δv are bounded, we have
∣
∣Δ∇Xεt
∣
∣≤ C
∫ t
0
[∣∣αεs −α0s
∣
∣
∣
∣∇Xs
∣
∣+
∣
∣βεs −β0s
∣
∣+
∣
∣γεs − γ0s
∣
∣]ds. (2.28)
Recall (2.21) and that fx, fu, fv are continuous. Thus, by (2.24) and the dominated con-
vergence theorem we get E{supt |∇Xεt −∇Xt|2} → 0. 
Corollary 2.7. Assume (A1)–(A3). Then
lim
→0
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
∣
∣∇Gεt −∇Gt
∣
∣2
}
= 0; lim
→0
∇Jε =∇J , (2.29)
where
∇Gt 
∫ t
0
[
gx∇Xs + guΔus + gvΔvs
]
ds;
∇J  E{U ′2
(
XT −CT
)[∇XT −ΔCT
]
+ λ∂xU1
(
CT ,GT
)
ΔCT + λ∂yU1
(
CT ,GT
)∇GT
}
.
(2.30)
Proof. First, by (A1) and (A3)(i) one can easily show that E{sup0≤t≤T |∇GT |2} <∞. Sim-
ilar to the proof of Lemma 2.6 one can prove
lim
→0
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
∣
∣∇Gεt −∇Gt
∣
∣2
}
= 0. (2.31)
We next prove the convergence of ∇Jε. By (A3)(ii) we know that ∇J is well defined.
Note that
∇Jε = E
{∫ 1
0
U ′2
(
XT −CT + θ
[(
XεT −XT
)− εΔCT
])
dθ
[∇XεT −ΔCT
]
+λ
∫ 1
0
∂xU1
(
CT+θεΔCT ,GεT
)
dθΔCT+λ
∫ 1
0
∂yU1
(
CT ,GT+θ
(
GεT −GT
))
dθ∇GεT
}
.
(2.32)
It is then straightforward to verify that the random variableVε−V inside the expectation
in ∇Jε −∇J =: E[Vε −V] converges to zero almost surely, as ε→ 0. Thus, we only have
to show that Vε, where∇Jε = E[Vε], is uniformly integrable. Note that by monotonicity
of U ′2 and ∂xU1, ∂yU1, we have
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ 1
0
U ′2
(
XT −CT + θ
[(
XεT −XT
)− εΔCT
])
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣≤
∣
∣U ′2
(
XT −CT
)∣∣+
∣
∣U ′2
(
XεT −CεT
)∣∣;
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ 1
0
∂xU1
(
CT + θεΔCT ,GεT
)
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣≤
∣
∣∂xU1
(
CT ,GεT
)∣∣+
∣
∣∂xU1
(
CεT ,G
ε
T
)∣∣;
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫ 1
0
∂yU1
(
CT ,GT + θ
(
GεT −GT
))
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣≤
∣
∣∂yU1
(
CT ,GT
)∣∣+
∣
∣∂yU1
(
CT ,GεT
)∣∣.
(2.33)
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Using this we get, for a generic constant C,
E
[∣∣Vε
∣
∣]≤ E
{∣
∣U ′2
(
XT −CT
)∣∣+
∣
∣U ′2
(
XεT −CεT
)∣∣
∣
∣[∇XεT −ΔCT
]∣∣
+ λ
(∣∣∂xU1
(
CT ,GεT
)∣∣+
∣
∣∂xU1
(
CεT ,G
ε
T
)∣∣)
∣
∣ΔCT
∣
∣
+ λ
(∣∣∂yU1
(
CT ,GT
)∣∣+
∣
∣∂yU1
(
CT ,GεT
)∣∣)
∣
∣∇GεT
∣
∣
}
≤ CE
{∣
∣U ′2
(
XT −CT
)∣∣2 +
∣
∣U ′2
(
XεT −CεT
)∣∣2 +
∣
∣∂xU1
(
CT ,GεT
)∣∣
+
∣
∣∂xU1
(
CεT ,G
ε
T
)∣∣+
∣
∣∂yU1
(
CT ,GT
)∣∣2 +
∣
∣∂yU1
(
CT ,GεT
)∣∣2
+
∣
∣[∇XεT −ΔCT
]∣∣2 +
∣
∣∇GεT
∣
∣2
}
.
(2.34)
Note that (A3)(ii) also holds true for variation (0,Δu,Δv) (maybe with different ε0).
Recalling Lemma 2.6 and (2.31), we conclude that Vε are uniformly integrable on ε ≤
ε0, for a small enough ε0, and applying the dominated convergence theorem we get the
following lim→0∇Jε =∇J . 
As usual when finding necessary conditions for stochastic control problems, we now
introduce appropriate adjoint processes as follows:
Y 1t =−λ∂yU1
(
CT ,GT
)−
∫ T
t
Z1s dWs;
Y 2t =U ′2
(
XT −CT
)−
∫ T
t
[
Y 1s gx
(
s,Xs,us,vs
)−Y 2s fx
(
s,Xs,us,vs
)]
ds−
∫ T
t
Z2s dWs.
(2.35)
Each of these is a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE), whose solution is
a pair of adapted processes (Yi,Zi), i = 1,2. Note that in the case U1(x, y) = U1(x)− y
we have Y 1t ≡ λ, Z1t ≡ 0. Also note that (A3)(ii) guarantees that the solution (Y 1,Z1) to
the first BSDE exists. Then by the fact that fx, gx are bounded and by (A3)(ii) again, the
solution (Y 2,Z2) to the second BSDE also exists. Moreover, by the BSDE theory, we have
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
[∣
∣Y 1t
∣
∣2 +
∣
∣Y 2t
∣
∣2
]
+
∫ T
0
[∣
∣Z1t
∣
∣2 +
∣
∣Z2t
∣
∣2
]
dt
}
<∞. (2.36)
Theorem 2.8. Assume (A1)–(A3). Then
∇J = E
{
Γ1TΔCT +
∫ T
0
[
Γ2tΔut +Γ
3
tΔvt
]
dt
}
, (2.37)
where
Γ1T  λ∂xU1
(
CT ,GT
)−U ′2
(
XT −CT
)
;
Γ2t  Y 2t fu
(
t,Xt,ut,vt
)−Y 1t gu
(
t,Xt,ut,vt
)
;
Γ3t  Y 2t fv
(
t,Xt,ut,vt
)−Y 1t gv
(
t,Xt ,ut,vt
)
+Z2t .
(2.38)
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Proof. By (2.30) and (2.35), obviously we have
∇J = E{Γ1TΔCT +Y 2T∇XT −Y 1T∇GT
}
. (2.39)
Recalling (2.19), (2.30), and (2.35), and applying Itoˆ’s formula we have
d
(
Y 2t ∇Xt −Y 1t ∇Gt
)= [Γ2tΔut +Γ3tΔvt
]
dt+Γ4t dWt, (2.40)
where Γ4t  Y 2t Δvt +∇XtZ2t −∇GtZ1t . Note that∇X and∇G are continuous, thus
sup
0≤t≤T
[∣
∣∇Xt
∣
∣2 +
∣
∣∇Gt
∣
∣2
]
<∞, a.s. (2.41)
By (2.36) we have
∫ T
0 [|Z1t |2 + |Z2t |2]dt <∞, a.s. Therefore,
∫ T
0
∣
∣Γ4t
∣
∣2dt <∞, a.s. (2.42)
Define a sequence of stopping times:
τn  inf
{
t > 0 :
∫ t
0
∣
∣Γ4s
∣
∣2ds > n
}
∧T. (2.43)
By (2.42) obviously we have τn ↑ T . By (2.40) and noting that∇X0 =∇G0 = 0, we have
E
{
Y 2τn∇Xτn −Y 1τn∇Gτn
}
= E
{∫ τn
0
[
Γ2tΔut +Γ
3
tΔvt
]
dt
}
. (2.44)
Note that Y 2t ,∇Xt, Y 1t ,∇Gt are continuous, and that
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
[∣
∣Y 2t
∣
∣2 +
∣
∣∇Xt
∣
∣2 +
∣
∣Y 1t
∣
∣2 +
∣
∣∇Gt
∣
∣2
]
+
∫ T
0
[∣∣Γ2t
∣
∣+
∣
∣Γ3t
∣
∣]dt
}
<∞. (2.45)
Let n→∞ in (2.44) and apply the dominated convergence theorem to get
E
{
Y 2T∇XT −Y 1T∇GT
}= E
{∫ T
0
[
Γ2tΔut +Γ
3
tΔvt
]
dt
}
, (2.46)
which, together with (2.39), proves the theorem. 
For the future use, note that from the above proof we have the following.
Lemma 2.9. Assume Xt =
∫ t
0 αsdWs +At is a continuous semimartingale. Suppose that
(1)
∫ T
0 |αt|2dt <∞, a.s;
(2) both Xt and At are uniformly (in t) integrable.
Then E[XT]= E[AT].
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
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Theorem 2.10 (necessary conditions for optimality). Assume (A1)–(A3). If (ĈT , û, v̂) ∈
 is the optimal solution for the problem of maximizing (2.15), then the following maximum
conditions hold true, with self-evident notation:
Γ̂1T = 0; Γ̂2t = 0; Γ̂3t = 0. (2.47)
Remark 2.11. (i) If we define the Hamiltonian H as
H
(
t,Xt,ut,vt,Yt,Zt
)
:= Y 2t f
(
t,Xt,ut,vt
)−Y 1t g
(
t,Xt,ut,vt
)
+Z2t vt, (2.48)
then the last two maximum conditions become
Hu
(
t, X̂t , ût, v̂t,Yt,Zt
)= 0, Hv
(
t, X̂t, ût, v̂t,Yt,Zt
)= 0. (2.49)
(ii) The condition Γ̂1T = 0 is a familiar optimality condition for risk-sharing, that ap-
pears in the literature in single-period models.
Proof of Theorem 2.10. Since (ĈT , û, v̂) is optimal, for any bounded ΔCT , Δu, Δv and any
small ε > 0, we have Ĵ ε ≤ Ĵ where Ĵ ε and Ĵ are defined in the obvious way. Thus ∇Ĵ ε ≤ 0.
By Corollary 2.7 we get∇Ĵ ≤ 0. In particular, for
ΔCT  sign
(
Γ̂1T
)
; Δut  sign
(
Γ̂2t
)
; Δvt  sign
(∇Γ̂3t
)
, (2.50)
we have
0≥∇Ĵ = E
{∣
∣Γ̂1T
∣
∣+
∫ T
0
[∣∣Γ̂2t
∣
∣+
∣
∣Γ̂3t
∣
∣]dt
}
, (2.51)
which obviously proves the theorem. 
We next show that the necessary conditions can be written as a coupled forward-
backward SDE. To this end, we note that λ > 0. By (A2) we have
∂
∂c
[
λ∂xU1(c,g)−U ′2(x− c)
]= λ∂xxU1(c,g) +U ′′2 (x− c)≤ 0. (2.52)
If we have strict inequality, then there exists a function F1 such that for any x, g, value
c  F1(x,g) is the solution to the equation
λ∂xU1(c,g)−U ′2(x− c)= 0. (2.53)
Similarly, for y1, y2 > 0, and any (t,x,u,v), by (A1) we know that
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
∂
∂u
(
y2 fu− y1gu
) ∂
∂v
(
y2 fu− y1gu
)
∂
∂u
(
y2 fv − y1gv
) ∂
∂v
(
y2 fv − y1gv
)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
= y2
[
fuu fuv
fuv fvv
]
− y1
[
guu guv
guv gvv
]
(2.54)
is negative definite. If it is strictly negative definite, then there exist functions F2, F3 such
that for any y1,y2>0 and any (t,x,z2), values uF2(t,x, y1, y2,z2) and vF3(t,x, y1, y2,z2)
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are the solution to the system of equations
y2 fu(t,x,u,v)− y1gu(t,x,u,v)= 0; y2 fv(t,x,u,v)− y1gv(t,x,u,v) + z2 = 0. (2.55)
Theorem 2.12. Assume (A1)–(A3), that there exist functions F1, F2, F3 as above, and that
( fugu)(t,x,u,v) > 0 for any (t,x,u,v). If (ĈT , û, v̂)∈ is the optimal solution for the prob-
lem of maximizing (2.15), then X̂ , Y 1, Y 2, Z1, and Z2 satisfy the following FBSDE:
Ĝt =
∫ t
0
ĝsds;
X̂t = x+
∫ t
0
f̂ (s)ds+
∫ t
0
F3
(
s, X̂s,Y 1s ,Y
2
s ,Z
2
s
)
dWs;
Y 1t =−λ∂yU1
(
F1
(
X̂T ,ĜT
)
,ĜT
)−
∫ T
t
Z1s dWs;
Y 2t =U ′2
(
X̂T −F1
(
X̂T ,ĜT
))−
∫ T
t
[
Y 1s ĝx(s)−Y 2s f̂x(s)
]
ds−
∫ T
t
Z2s dWs,
(2.56)
where, for ϕ= f ,g, fx,gx,
ϕ(s)  ϕ
(
s,Xs,F2
(
s,Xs,Y 1s ,Y
2
s ,Z
2
s
)
, F3
(
s,Xs,Y 1s ,Y
2
s ,Z
2
s
))
. (2.57)
Moreover, the optimal controls are
ĈT = F1
(
X̂T ,ĜT
)
;
ût = F2
(
s, X̂s,Y 1s ,Y
2
s ,Z
2
s
)
;
v̂t = F3
(
s, X̂s,Y 1s ,Y
2
s ,Z
2
s
)
.
(2.58)
Proof. By Theorem 2.10 we have (2.47). From Γ1T = 0 we get ĈT = F1(X̂T ,ĜT). Since
λ∂yU1 < 0, we have Y 1t > 0. Moreover, by Γ
2
t = 0 and the assumption that fugu > 0 we
get Y 2t > 0. Then we have
ût = F2
(
s, X̂s,Y 1s ,Y
2
s ,Z
2
s
)
;
v̂t = F3
(
s, X̂s,Y 1s ,Y
2
s ,Z
2
s
)
.
(2.59)
Now by the definition of the processes on the left-hand sides of (2.56), we see that the
right-hand sides are true. 
Remark 2.13. The existence and uniqueness of FBSDEs is studied, among other papers,
in [6, 14], and in the monograph by Ma and Yong [9] which contains more references.
Since the coefficients of our FBSDE depend on inverse functions F1, F2, F3, it does not
seem feasible to state a nice set of sufficient conditions under which the existence and
uniqueness would be guaranteed. In the examples we solve in Section 4, it turns out that
we do not use the FBSDE form (2.56), but we manage to guess the explicit relationship
between adjoint processes Y1 and Y2, express Z2 as a function of other variables setting
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Γ3 ≡ 0 in (2.38), then treat equations for Y1, Y2 as forward SDEs and the equation for X
as the backward SDE. In general, there is no explicit relationship between Y1 and Y2 and
this is not possible.
2.3. Sufficient conditions for optimality. Let us assume that there is a multiple (ĈT , X̂ ,
Y 1,Y 2,Z1,Z2, û, v̂) that satisfies the necessary conditions of Theorem 2.10. We want to
check that those are also sufficient conditions, that is, that (ĈT , û, v̂) is optimal. Here,
it is essential to have the concavity of f and −g. Let (CT ,u,v) be an arbitrary admissible
control triple, with corresponding X ,G, and we allow now ε0 = 0 in the assumption (A3).
We have
J
(
ĈT , û, v̂
)− J(CT ,u,v
)
= E
{[
U2
(
X̂T − ĈT
)−U2
(
XT −CT
)]
+ λ
[
U1
(
ĈT ,ĜT
)−U1
(
CT ,GT
)]}
.
(2.60)
By concavity of Ui, the terminal conditions on Yi, and from Γ̂1 = 0, or equivalently Û ′2 =
λ∂xÛ1, suppressing the arguments of these functions, we get
J
(
ĈT , û, v̂
)− J(CT ,u,v
)
≥ E{[(X̂T −XT
)− (ĈT −CT
)]
Û ′2 + λ
[(
ĈT −CT
)
∂xÛ1 +
(
ĜT −GT
)
∂yÛ1
]}
= E{(X̂T −XT
)
Û ′2 + λ
(
ĜT −GT
)
∂yÛ1
}= E{Y 2T
(
X̂T −XT
)−Y 1T
(
ĜT −GT
)}
= E
{∫ T
0
[
Y 2t
(
f̂ (t)− f (t))+Z2t
(
v̂t − vt
)−Y 1t
(
ĝ(t)− g(t))
− (X̂t −Xt
)(
Y 2t f̂x(t)−Y 1t ĝx(t)
)]
dt
}
= E
{∫ T
0
[
H
(
t, X̂t, ût, v̂t,Yt,Zt
)−H(t,Xt ,ut,vt,Yt,Zt
)
− (X̂t −Xt
)
Hx
(
t, X̂t, ût, v̂t,Yt,Zt
)]
dt
}
.
(2.61)
Here, the second to last equality is proved using Itoˆ’s rule and the dominated convergence
theorem, and in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 2.8. Note that Y 1 is positive, as a
martingale with positive terminal value. Then, from Y 2 f̂u = Y 1ĝu, we know that Y 2t is also
positive. Since f and −g are concave in (Xt,ut,vt), this implies that H(t,Xt ,ut,vt,Yt,Zt)
is also concave in (Xt,ut,vt), and we have
(
X̂t −Xt
)
Hx
(
t, X̂t , ût, v̂t,Yt,Zt
)≤H(t, X̂t , ût, v̂t,Yt,Zt
)−H(t,Xt,ut,vt,Yt,Zt
)
(2.62)
since, by Remark 2.11, ∂uĤ = ∂vĤ = 0. Thus, J(ĈT , û, v̂)− J(CT ,u,v)≥ 0.We have proved
the following.
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Theorem 2.14. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.10, if ĈT , û, v̂, X̂t, Y 1t , Y
2
t , Z
1
t , Z
2
t
satisfy the necessary conditions of Theorem 2.10, and (ĈT , û, v̂) is admissible, possibly with
ε0 = 0, then (ĈT , û, v̂) is an optimal triple for the problem of maximizing J(CT ,u,v;λ).
Remark 2.15. There remains a question of determining the appropriate Lagrange multi-
plier λ̂, if it exists. We now describe the usual way for identifying it, without giving as-
sumptions for this method to work. Instead, we refer the reader to Luenberger [8]. First,
define
V˜(λ)= sup
C,u,v
E
[
U2
(
Xu,vT −CT
)
+ λU1
(
CT ,G
u,v
T
)]
. (2.63)
Then, the appropriate λ̂ is the one that minimizes V˜(λ)− λR, if it exists. If for this λ= λ̂
there exists an optimal control (Ĉ, û, v̂) for the problem on the right-hand side of (2.16),
and if we have E[U1(ĈT ,G
û,v̂
T )]= R, then (Ĉ, û, v̂) is also optimal for the problem on the
left-hand side of (2.16).
3. Implementing the first-best solution
We now consider the situation in which the agent chooses the controls (u,v). Although
the condition Γ̂1T = 0 determines the value of the contract CT at time T as a function of
XT , GT , typically, it is not true that the contract can be offered as such a function, and
still induce the agent to implement optimal (u,v).
We assume that the function U ′2 is a one-to-one function on its domain, with the
inverse function denoted
I2(z) :=
(
U ′2
)−1
(z). (3.1)
Note that the boundary condition Y 2T = U ′2(X̂T − ĈT) gives another value for CT , ĈT =
X̂T − I2(Y 2T). In the problem of executive compensation, this has an interpretation of the
executive being payed by the difference between the stock value and a value I2(Y 2T) of a
benchmark portfolio. We will see that the contract of this form indeed induces the agent
to apply the first-best controls (û, v̂). We have the following.
Definition 3.1. An admissible triple (ĈT , û, v̂) is said to be implementable if there exists
an implementable contract F such that uF = û, vF = v̂ and that F(ω,Xû,v̂)= Ĉ.
Since we assume here that both the agent and the principal have full information,
the first-best contract will be implementable since the principal observes (u,v) and can
punish the agent if she does not apply the optimal (u,v). However, we now show that
the optimal (u,v) can be implemented by a natural contract without direct punishment,
which includes the framework studied in Ou-Yang [13].
Proposition 3.2. Assume (A1)–(A3) and suppose that there exists λ̂ > 0 so that the neces-
sary conditions are satisfied with ĈT , û, v̂, X̂ , Ĝ, Y 1,Y 2, Z1,Z2, that (ĈT , û, v̂) is admissible,
and that the IR constraint is satisfied as an equality, that is,
E
[
U1
(
ĈT ,ĜT
)]= R. (3.2)
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Then, the first-best triple (Ĉ, û, v̂) is implementable with the contract
F(ω,X)= XT − I2
(
Y 2T(ω)
)
. (3.3)
In particular, it is sufficient for the principal to observe {Wt}0≤t≤T and XT in order to imple-
ment the first-best contract.
Proof. It suffices to show that (û, v̂)maximizes E[U1(XT − I2(Y 2T),GT)]. Similarly as above
for the principal’s problem, denoting by Y˜ i/λ̂, Z˜i/λ̂ the adjoint processes for the agent’s
problem, we can verify that the necessary and sufficient conditions for (u˜, v˜) to be optimal
for the agent are given by the system
dX˜t = f
(
t, X˜t, u˜t, v˜t
)
dt+ v˜tdWt, X˜0 = x, dY˜ 1t = Z˜1t dWt,
dY˜ 2t =
[
Y˜ 1t gx
(
t, X˜t, u˜t, v˜t
)− Y˜ 2t fx
(
t, X˜t, u˜t, v˜t
)]
dt+ Z˜2t dWt,
Y˜ 1T =−λ̂∂yU1
(
X˜T − I2
(
Y 2T
)
,G˜T
)
, Y˜ 2T = λ̂∂xU1
(
X˜T − I2
(
Y 2T
)
,G˜T
)
,
(3.4)
with the maximum conditions
Y˜ 2t fu
(
t, X˜t, u˜t, v˜t
)= Y˜ 1t gu
(
t, X˜t, u˜t, v˜t
)
,
Y˜ 2t fv
(
t, X˜t, u˜t, v˜t
)
+ Z˜2t = Y˜ 1t gv
(
t, X˜t , u˜t, v˜t
)
.
(3.5)
It is now easy to see that ĈT , û, v̂, X̂ , Ĝ, Yi, Zi satisfy this system. By defining H as in
Remark 2.11 and noting that H is concave, analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.14 one
can show that the pair (û, v̂) is optimal for the agent. Also, ĈT = X̂T − I2(Y 2T)= F(ω, X̂).

3.1. Increasing state-contingent compensation and uniqueness of optimal contracts.
We have seen that the contract F(ω,X)= XT − I2(Y 2T) implements the first-best solution.
However, in general, this is not the only contract that does that. In order to get unique-
ness, we have to reduce the space of admissible contracts. One natural thing to do is to
see whether we can have optimal contracts in the option-like form F(XT), for some de-
terministic function F, as, for example, in Ross [15]. In Cadenillas et al. [1], sufficient
conditions are found under which there is a contract of such a form which attains the
maximal possible utility for the principal, although it does not necessarily implement the
first-best solution (û, v̂, Ĉ). Moreover, the conditions are quite strong, and in particular,
there is no control u of the drift. We generalize their result in Example 4.7. In general, it
is not possible to implement the first-best solution with the contracts of the form F(XT).
Instead, we consider the following contracts.
Definition 3.3. A contract is said to be of the increasing state-contingent compensation
(ISCC) type if it is of the form F(XT)−DT , where F(x) is a deterministic function, such
that F′(x) > 0, and DT is a T measurable random variable.
The contract F(ω,X) = XT − I2(Y 2T) is of the ISCC type, and we will show that it is
the only contract which implements the first-best solution in that family. As mentioned
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above, the first-best contract can be implemented by a “dictatorial” contract, where the
agent gets penalized by negative compensation if he does not use the first-best con-
trol. In practice, it is more natural, and consistent with real applications, to consider
contracts of the ISCC type, where the payoff depends on the performance of the un-
derlying process X compared to a benchmark. We have the following uniqueness re-
sult.
Proposition 3.4. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.2 and if range(X̂T) = R and
fugu > 0, the contract F(ω,X)= XT − I2(Y 2T) is the only ISCC type contract that implements
the first-best solution.
Proof. Introduce the agent’s objective function, given a contract F(XT)−DT :
A(u,v)  EU1
(
F
(
XT
)−DT ,GT
)
;
Aε A
(
uε,vε
)
; A A(u,v); ∇Aε  A
ε−A
ε
,
(3.6)
where uε, vε are defined as earlier. Similarly as before, we can check that
∇A lim
ε→0
∇Aε = E{∂xU1
(
F
(
XT
)−DT ,GT
)
F′
(
XT
)∇XT + ∂yU1
(
F
(
XT
)−DT ,GT
)∇GT
}
.
(3.7)
We define the following two adjoint processes via BSDEs:
K1t =−∂yU1
(
F
(
XT
)−DT ,GT
)−
∫ T
t
L1s dWs;
K2t = ∂xU1
(
F
(
XT
)−DT ,GT
)
F′
(
XT
)
−
∫ T
t
[
K1s gx
(
s,Xs,us,vs
)−K2s fx
(
s,Xs,us,vs
)]
ds−
∫ T
t
L2s dWs.
(3.8)
Then, we can also check similarly as before that
∇A= E
{∫ T
0
(
K2s fu(s)−K1s gu(s)
)
Δusds+
∫ T
0
(
K2s fv(s)−K1s gv(s) +L2s
)
Δvsds
}
. (3.9)
At the optimal (u,v), we have ∇A ≤ 0. Assume now that the contract F(XT)−DT im-
plements the first-best solution, so that (û, v̂, X̂T) is the optimal solution to the agent’s
problem, and F(X̂T)−DT = ĈT . From∇A≤ 0, we get
K2t
K1t
= gu
(
t, X̂t , û, v̂
)
fu
(
t, X̂t, û, v̂
) (3.10)
for almost all (t,ω), then by continuity also for t = T . Comparing with the necessary
condition Γ2t = 0 (see (2.38)), we have
K2T
K1T
= Y
2
T
Y 1T
. (3.11)
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Then, from (2.35) and (3.8), we obtain
F′
(
X̂T
)= −K
2
T∂yU1
(
ĈT ,ĜT
)
K1T∂xU1
(
ĈT ,ĜT
) = −Y
2
T∂yU1
(
ĈT ,ĜT
)
Y 1T∂xU1
(
ĈT ,ĜT
) = 1. (3.12)
Thus, we can write
F(x)= x+ b (3.13)
for some constant b. Since we assume F(X̂T)−DT = ĈT , we get
DT − b= I2
(
Y 2T
)
. (3.14)

4. Examples
Example 4.1 (one-dimensional, linear dynamics). We solve here one of the problems
considered in Cadenillas et al. [1], and solved therein using a different approach. All other
examples solved in that paper can also be solved using the approach of this paper, and in
a more straightforward way, if we account for the modification of Remark 2.3. We are
given
dXt = f
(
ut
)
dt+αvtdt+ vtdWt (4.1)
andGT =
∫ T
0 g(ut)dt, whereW is one-dimensional. If f = g = 0, this is the case of portfo-
lio management. We further discuss this case (also with a nonzero cost function g(t,X ,u,
v)), in more detail in examples below. The agent’s utility is nonseparable, U1(x, y) =
U1(x − y). We denote I1(z) := (U ′1)−1(z). If there is a control u and penalty GT on it,
the corresponding necessary and sufficient conditions are
dX̂t = f
(
ût
)
dt+αv̂tdt+ v̂tdWt, X̂0 = x,
dY 1t = Z1t dWt, dY 2t = Z2t dWt,
Y 1T = Y 2T =U ′2
(
X̂T − ĈT
)= λ̂U ′1
(
ĈT − ĜT
)
.
(4.2)
We see that Y 1 = Y 2, Z1 = Z2, so that the maximum conditions become
f ′(û)= g′(û), αY 2t =−Z2t . (4.3)
(If there is no control u, thenY 1 = 0.)We assume that the first equality above has a unique
solution û, which is then constant. The second equality gives Y 2t = zλ̂exp{−(1/2)α2t−
αWt} for some z > 0, to be determined below. The optimal contract should be of the
form
ĈT = X̂T − I2
(
Y 2T
)= I1
(
Y 2T
λ̂
)
+ ĜT . (4.4)
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The value of z has to be chosen so that E[U1(I1(Y 2T/λ̂))] = R, assuming such a value z
exists. Denote Zt := Y 2t /zλ̂. Then Z is a martingale with Z0 = 1. We have
d
(
ZtX̂t
)= Zt
[
f
(
û
)
dt+ v̂tdWt
]
(4.5)
so that ZtX̂t −
∫ t
0 Zs f (û)ds has to be a martingale. The above system of necessary and
sufficient conditions will have a solution if we can find v̂ using the martingale represen-
tation theorem, where we now consider the equation for ZX̂ as a Backward SDE having a
terminal condition
ZTX̂T = ZT
{
I2
(
zλ̂ZT
)
+ I1
(
zZT
)
+ ĜT
}
. (4.6)
This BSDE has a solution which satisfies X̂0 = x if and only if there is a solution λ̂ > 0 of
the equation
x = E[ZTX̂T
]− f (û)T = E[ZT
{
I2
(
zλ̂ZT
)
+ I1
(
zZT
)
+ ĜT
}]− f (û)T. (4.7)
This is indeed the case in examples with exponential utilities Ui(x)=−(1/γi)e−γix, γi > 0,
solved in Cadenillas et al. [1]. It is straightforward in this case to check that the solution
obtained by the method of this example is indeed admissible. The same is true for power
utilities, Ui(x)= (1/γi)xγi , γi < 1, if we account for Remark 2.3.
Example 4.2 (no drift control). We consider now an example with no control u of the
drift, thus fu = g = 0. We call this case the risk-sharing model. More precisely,
dXt = f
(
t,Xt ,vt
)
dt+ vtdWt, (4.8)
whereW is one-dimensional. Assume that the contract F(XT)−DT implements the first-
best solution. In (3.8) we have K1t = L1t = 0, and
K2t =U ′1
(
F
(
XT
)−DT
)
F′
(
XT
)
+
∫ T
t
[
K2s fx
(
s,Xs,vs
)]
ds−
∫ T
t
L2s dWs. (4.9)
The necessary condition for the agent is
L2t
K2t
=− fv
(
t, X̂t , v̂
)
(4.10)
and, from Γ3 = 0 (see (2.38)), we also get
Z2t
Y 2t
=− fv
(
t, X̂t, v̂
)
. (4.11)
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Solving the equations of K2 and Y 2 we see that
K2T =U ′1
(
F
(
XT
)−DT
)
F′
(
XT
)
= K0 exp
{∫ T
0
[
fx
(
t, X̂t, v̂t
)− 1
2
∥
∥ fv
(
t, X̂t, v̂
)∥∥2
]
dt+
∫ T
0
fv
(
t, X̂t, v̂
)
dWt
}
,
Y 2T = λ̂U ′1
(
ĈT
)
= λ̂yλ̂ exp
{∫ T
0
[
fx
(
t, X̂t, v̂t
)− 1
2
∫ T
0
∥
∥ fv
(
t, X̂t, v̂
)∥∥2
]
dt+
∫ T
0
fv
(
t, X̂t, v̂
)
dWt
}
(4.12)
for some constants K0, yλ̂. From ĈT = F(X̂T)−DT , we have
F′
(
X̂T
)= K
2
T
U ′1
(
F
(
X̂T
)−DT
) = K
2
T
Y 2T/λ̂
= K0
yλ̂
. (4.13)
This means, if range(X̂T)=R, we can write
F(x)= kx+ b (4.14)
for some positive constant k, which is arbitrary. From
I1
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
= ĈT = kX̂T + b−DT = k
([
I1
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
+ I2
(
Y 2T
)
])
+ b−DT , (4.15)
we have
b−DT = I1
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
− k
[
I1
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
+ I2
(
Y 2T
)
]
. (4.16)
This gives us the necessity part of the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. In the risk-sharing model described above, if range(X̂T)=R, if an ISCC-
type contract can implement the first-best solution, then it takes the form
F
(
XT
)−DT = kXT + I1
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
− k
[
I1
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
+ I2
(
Y 2T
)
]
(4.17)
with any positive number k. If in addition f (t,x,v)= αv, then any such contract, that also
satisfies the IR constraint, implements the first-best solution.
Proof. It remains to show sufficiency, that is, the last statement. In this linear model we
have fx = 0, fv = α, so that, from (4.12), the ratio K2T/Y 2T is a constant. We then get, from
(4.9), that
F
(
XT
)−DT = I1
(
1
k
K2T
)
= I1
(
cY 2T
)
(4.18)
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for some constants c1, c. However, this constant is determined uniquely from the IR con-
straint, that is, c = 1/λ̂. Thus, substituting F(XT)−DT from (4.17) in (4.18), we get
XT = I1
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
+ I2
(
Y 2T
)
(4.19)
which is the same as the first-best. 
Notice that with fu = g = 0, the increasing state-contingent compensation is not quite
unique, unlike the case of Proposition 4.3.
We now have the following result.
Corollary 4.4. If there exists a positive number k̂, such that
I1
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
− k̂
[
I1
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
+ I2
(
Y 2T
)
]
=m (4.20)
for some constant m, then the first-best solution can be implemented by the linear contract
H
(
XT
)= k̂XT +m (4.21)
if the IR constraint is satisfied under this contract.
Example 4.5 (semilinear drift and cost, exponential utilities and linear contracts). Con-
sider now this generalization of the previous example:
dXt =
[
rtXt + f
(
t,ut,vt
)]
dt+ vtdWt, (4.22)
where f is a deterministic function of (t,u,v) and rt is a given deterministic process.
Assume exponential utility functions, Ui(x) = −(1/Ri)exp{−Rix}. Also assume, with a
slight abuse of notation g, that
g
(
t,Xt,ut,vt
)= μtXt + g
(
t,ut,vt
)
, (4.23)
where g is a deterministic function of (t,u,v), and μt is a given deterministic process.
Denote
γt,s := e
∫ t
s rudu, γt := e
∫ t
0 rudu. (4.24)
Then, it is seen that
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
γt,s f
(
s,us,vs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
γt,svsdWs. (4.25)
We want to show that the optimal û, v̂ are deterministic, and we want to see under what
conditions we can offer a linear contract.
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The adjoint processes Y 1, Y 2 satisfy
Y 1t = λU ′1
(
CT −GT
)−
∫ T
t
Z1s dWs,
Y 2t =U ′2
(
XT −CT
)−
∫ T
t
(
Y 1s μs−Y 2s rs
)
ds−
∫ T
t
[
Y 1s g˜v
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)−Y 2s fv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)]
dWs.
(4.26)
The maximum conditions give Y 1T = Y 2T .
We conjecture that optimal û, v̂ are deterministic processes, and that
Y 1t = htY 2t , hT = 1, (4.27)
where h is a deterministic function of time. Using Itoˆ’s rule, it is easily verified that the
above equality is satisfied if h is a solution to the ODE:
ht
(
htμt − rt
)=−h′t , hT = 1. (4.28)
We assume that μ and r are such that a unique solution exists. We get one equation for û,
v̂ by setting Γ2 = 0 (see (2.38)):
fu
(
t, ût, v̂t
)= hgu
(
t, ût, v̂t
)
. (4.29)
Note that we can solve for Y 2 as
Y 2t = Y 20 exp
{∫ t
0
[
hsμs− rs− 12
∥
∥hsgv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)− fv
(
s, ûsv̂s
)∥∥2
]
dt
+
∫ t
0
[
hsgv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)− fv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)]
dWs
}
.
(4.30)
Thus, the process
At = log
(
Y 2t
Y 20
)
−
∫ t
0
[
hsμs− rs− 12
∥
∥hsgv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)− fv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)∥∥2
]
dt
=
∫ t
0
[
hsgv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)− fv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)]
dWs
(4.31)
is a local martingale. We conjecture that it is a martingale for the optimal û, v̂.
We will need below this representation for the first term ofGT , obtained by integration
by parts:
∫ T
0
μsXsds= XT
γT
∫ T
0
μsγsds−
∫ T
0
∫ s
0
μuγudu
[
f
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)
γ−1s ds+ γ
−1
s v̂sdWs
]
. (4.32)
From the maximum condition λU ′1(CT −GT)=U ′2(XT −CT), we can verify that
XT −CT = a+ bXT − bGT , a= log(λ)
R1 +R2
, b = R1
R1 +R2
. (4.33)
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From this and Y 2T =U ′2(XT −CT) we get
logY 2T =−aR2 + bR2
(
GT −XT
)
. (4.34)
From this, using the fact that v̂ is assumed deterministic, denoting by d a generic constant,
we can get an alternative representation of At as
At = Et
[
AT
]= d+ bR2Et
[
GT −XT
]
. (4.35)
Using (4.32) and that the nondeterministic part of GT is
∫ T
0 μuXudu, we get
At = d+ bR2
(∫ T
0 μsγsds
γT
− 1
)
Et
[
XT
]− bR2
∫ t
0
(∫ s
0
μuγudu
)
γsv̂sdWs. (4.36)
Since Et[XT]= X0 +
∫ t
0 γT ,sv̂sdWs, comparing the dW integrand in this last expression to
the dW integrand in (4.31), we see that we need to have
hsgv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)− fv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)= bR2
(∫ T
0 μsγsds
γT
− 1
)
γT ,sv̂s− bR2
(∫ s
0
μuγudu
)
γ−1s v̂s
= γ−1s v̂sbR2
(∫ T
s
μuγudu− γT
)
.
(4.37)
We assume that g and f are such that this equation together with (4.29) has a unique
solution (ûs, v̂s) for all s, and such that in the above calculations the local martingales are,
indeed, martingales. Then, we have shown that our conjecture of deterministic optimal
controls was correct, and (û, v̂) is the first-best solution.
Remark 4.6. We can get the problem solved in Ou-Yang [13] as a special case of this
example. (That paper considers a model with a multidimensional Brownian motion, and
we could modify our example to deal with that case.) In that problem,
f (t,u,v)= αv, g(t,u,v)= ktv
2
2
, rt ≡ r, μt ≡ μ, (4.38)
where μ, r are constant, and kt is a deterministic function of time. Then, we can compute
from (4.28) and (4.37)
ht =
[
μ
r
+
(
1−μ
r
)
er(T−t)
]−1
, v̂t = αht
bR2 + kth2t
. (4.39)
Knowing this we also know Y 2t , and the optimal contract ĈT = XT − I2(Y 2T).
We still want to see under what conditions we can offer a linear contract, using similar
arguments as in Proposition 4.3 and Corollary 4.4. Let us first see under what conditions
the contract
Ck := kXT + (1− k)I1
(
Y 2T
λ
)
− kI2
(
Y 2T
)
(4.40)
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implements the first-best solution v̂ for any positive k. If the agent is given the contract
Ck, the corresponding adjoint equations are
K1t =U ′1
(
Ck −GT
)−
∫ T
t
L1s dWs,
K2t = kU ′1
(
Ck −GT
)−
∫ T
t
(
K1s μs−K2s rs
)
ds−
∫ T
t
[
K1s gv
(
s,us,vs
)−K2s fv
(
s,us,vs
)]
dWs.
(4.41)
We see that K2T = kK1T .
Similarly as before, we conjecture that the agent’s optimal v is a deterministic process,
and we can see that
K1t = βtK2t , βT =
1
k
, (4.42)
where β is a deterministic function of time, with β being a solution to the ODE (4.28),
but with βT = 1/k. We can solve for K2 as
K2t = K20 exp
{∫ t
0
[
βsμs− rs− 12
∥
∥βsgv
(
s,us,vs
)− fv
(
s,us,vs
)∥∥2
]
dt
+
∫ t
0
[
βsgv
(
s,us,vs
)− fv
(
s,us,vs
)]
dWs
}
.
(4.43)
On the other hand, from K2T = kU ′1(Ck −GT) we get
K2T = k exp
{
−R1
[
kXT + (1− k)I1
(
Y 2T
λ
)
− kI2
(
Y 2T
)−GT
]}
. (4.44)
Substituting here Ii(y)=− log(y)/Ri, the expression (4.25) for XT , the expression (4.32)
for the random part of GT , and the expression (4.30) for Y 2T , and comparing the random
terms with the one in (4.43), we see that we need to have
βsgv
(
s,uS,vs
)− fv
(
s,us,vs
)
=
(
1− k− kR1
R2
)
[
hsgv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)− fv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)]
+R1
(∫ T
0 μsγsds
γT
− k
)
γT ,svs−R1
(∫ s
0
μuγudu
)
γsv̂s
=
(
1− k− kR1
R2
)
[
hsgv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)− fv
(
s, ûs, v̂s
)]
+R1
vs
γs
(∫ T
s
μuγudu− kγT
)
.
(4.45)
We want to see under what conditions u= û, v = v̂, where (û, v̂) is the first-best solution
determined by (4.29) and (4.37). We can easily verify that this happens if there is no
control u, g = 0, and μ= 0. In other words, if the cost function is zero and there is no drift
control, then the contract Ck with any k > 0 implements the first-best solution.
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Let us now show that, if g = 0, μ = 0, we can use Corollary 4.4 to make Ck linear for
some k = k̂. We have Ii(x)=−(1/Ri) log(x). Introduce a deterministic process
δs := hsgv
(
s, v̂s
)− fv
(
s, v̂s
)
. (4.46)
We want to have
m=− 1
R1
log
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
− k̂
[
− 1
R1
log
(
1
λ̂
Y 2T
)
− 1
R2
log
(
Y 2T
)
]
, (4.47)
or
m= 1− k
R1
[
log
(
λ̂
Y 20
)
+
∫ T
0
{
hsμs− rs + 12δ
2
s
}
ds
]
− k
R2
[∫ T
0
{
hsμs− rs + 12δ
2
s
}
ds
]
+
[
1− k
R1
− k
R2
]∫ T
0
δsdWs,
(4.48)
which is satisfied if
(1− k̂)
R1
− k̂
R2
= 0, (4.49)
that is,
k̂ = R2
R1 +R2
. (4.50)
By Proposition 4.3 and Corollary 4.4, in this model with g = 0, μ= 0, contract Ck̂ is linear
and it implements the first-best solution.
Example 4.7 (deterministic, option-like contracts). Consider again the model with f =
αv, where v may be d-dimensional. Let us write
Yt := Y 2t = ŷ exp
{
−αWt − t‖α‖
2
2
}
=: ŷZt (4.51)
for some ŷ > 0, where Z is a notation for the exponential martingale process. From (3.8)
we see that the process K2 is of the form
Kt := K2t = k̂ exp
{
−αWt − t‖α‖
2
2
}
= k̂Zt (4.52)
for some number k̂. We can show then a multidimensional generalization of this result
from Cadenillas et al. [1] about the optimal contract being solely a function F(XT) of the
terminal value XT .
Proposition 4.8. Consider the model with f (t,x,u,v) = αv. Assume that there exists a
function F(x)= F(x; ẑ) which satisfies the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
U ′1
(
F(x)
)
F′(x)= ẑ
ŷ
U ′2
(
x−F(x)), (4.53)
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where ŷ = Y 20 , and ẑ is a given constant. Assume that there is a unique function x(y) =
x(y; ẑ) such that
U ′1
(
F
(
x(y)
))
F′
(
x(y)
)= y. (4.54)
Also assume that ẑ and the boundary condition for the solution F(x) of the above ODE can
be chosen so that ẑ is a unique solution of
E
[
ZTx
(
ẑZT
)]= X0 (4.55)
and so that
E
[
U1
(
F
(
x
(
ẑZT
)))]= R. (4.56)
Then, the principal will attain the first-best utility with the contract F(XT).
Proof. Given such a contract, it can be shown as before that the agent’s optimal process
X̂ is related to the adjoint process K2 of (3.8), from which we get
XT = x
(
k̂ZT
)
. (4.57)
It is easy to check that the product process ZX is a martingale, from which it follows
k̂ = ẑ, comparing to (4.55). From ODE (4.53) and (4.54), we then get
U ′2
(
XT −F
(
XT
))= ŷZT (4.58)
or
XT −F
(
XT
)= I2
(
ŷZT
)
. (4.59)
But then the principal’s utility is equal to
E
[
U2
(
XT −F
(
XT
))]= E[U2
(
I2
(
YT
))]
, (4.60)
which is the first-best. 
Remark 4.9. Larsen [7] computes numerically an optimal contract in this context, with
power utilities, using a different approach. We provide here an alternative way to find
an optimal contract, namely solving the above ODE. This would again have to be done
numerically.
5. Conclusions
We have built a fairly general theory for contracting problems in models driven by Brow-
nian motion, and with full information. A question still remains under which general
conditions the optimal contract exists. The recent popular application is the optimal
compensation of executives. In order to have more realistic framework for that appli-
cation, other forms of compensation should be considered, such as a possibility for the
agent to cash in the contract at a random time (compensation of American options type).
We leave these problems for future research.
Jaksˇa Cvitanic´ et al. 27
Acknowledgment
The research is supported in part by NSF Grants DMS 00-99549 and DMS 04-03575.
References
[1] A. Cadenillas, J. Cvitanic´, and F. Zapatero, Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice, to
appear in Journal of Economic Theory.
[2] J. Cvitanic´, X. Wan, and J. Zhang, Continuous-time principal-agent problems with hidden action:
the weak formulation, Working paper, University of Southern California, California, 2005.
[3] D. Duffie, P.-Y. Geoffard, and C. Skiadas, Efficient and equilibrium allocations with stochastic
differential utility, Journal of Mathematical Economics 23 (1994), no. 2, 133–146.
[4] B. Dumas, R. Uppal, and T.Wang, Efficient intertemporal allocations with recursive utility, Journal
of Economic Theory 93 (2000), no. 2, 240–259.
[5] B. Holmstro¨m and P. Milgrom, Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incen-
tives, Econometrica 55 (1987), no. 2, 303–328.
[6] Y. Hu and S. Peng, Solution of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, Probability The-
ory and Related Fields 103 (1995), no. 2, 273–283.
[7] K. Larsen, Optimal portfolio delegation when parties have different coefficients of risk aversion,
Quantitative Finance 5 (2005), no. 5, 503–512.
[8] D. G. Luenberger, Optimization by Vector Space Methods, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1997.
[9] J. Ma and J. Yong, Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations and Their Applications,
Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 1702, Springer, Berlin, 1999.
[10] H. Mu¨ller, The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal agent problem with expo-
nential utility, Journal of Economic Theory 79 (1998), 276–280.
[11] , Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems, Journal of Economic Theory
91 (2000), 292–301.
[12] B. Oksendal and A. Sulem, Applied Stochastic Control of Jump Diffusions, Springer, Berlin, 2004.
[13] H. Ou-Yang, Optimal contracts in a continuous-time delegated portfolio management problem,
Review of Financial Studies 16 (2003), 173–208.
[14] S. Peng and Z. Wu, Fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations and applica-
tions to optimal control, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 37 (1999), no. 3, 825–843.
[15] S. A. Ross, The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem, American Economic Review
63 (1973), 134–139.
[16] J. Yong, Completeness of security markets and solvability of linear backward stochastic dierential
equations, Working paper, University of Central Florida, Florida, 2004.
[17] J. Yong and X. Y. Zhou, Stochastic Controls. Hamiltonian Systems and HJB Equations, Applica-
tions of Mathematics (New York), vol. 43, Springer, New York, 1999.
Jaksˇa Cvitanic´: Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech, MC 228-77,
1200 E California Boulevard, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA
E-mail address: cvitanic@hss.caltech.edu
Xuhu Wan: Department of Information and Systems Management, HKUST Business School,
Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong
E-mail address: imwan@ust.hk
Jianfeng Zhang: Department of Mathematics MC 2532, University of Southern California,
3620 S Vermont Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90089-1113, USA
E-mail address: jianfenz@usc.edu
